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Book Reviews
JUDICIAL

REVIEW

IN

THE

CONTEMPORARY

WORLD.

By

Mauro

Cappelletti,1 Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1971. Pp. xi, 117. $8.50 ($4.50 student
edition).

In the present age of democracy much attention is being paid to the
problem of how to curb majority rule. Not only dictators can ride
roughshod over basic interests of individuals. Democratically elected
majorities may just as well be tyrants. Examples abound. How can
individuals and minorities be protected? The inclusion in national
constitutions and international declarations of catalogues of basic
human rights does not suffice. How can legislatures be effectively
prevented from disregarding such limitations? Mechanisms to guarantee the observance of constitutional limitations on legislative power
have been established in numerous countries. They are comprehensively discussed in the book under review. Its author, Mauro Cappelletti, is
simultaneously a member of the law faculties of the University of
Florence and of Stanford University and is Director of the Institute of
Comparative Law at the University of Florence. He is a humanist and
a man deeply concerned about human rights and social justice. As one
of the world's leading comparatists he places the institution of judicial
review in a worldwide frame. Indeed, the book opens with a citation
to Jacob Burckhardt's observation that:
In the realm of thought, it is supremely just and right that all frontiers
should be swept away. There is too little of high spiritual value scattered
over the earth for
any epoch to say: we are utterly self-sufficient or even we
2
prefer our own.
Comparison of legal systems is the search for the technical legal
method that is best suited under given national conditions to deal with
a social problem common to all nations included in the review.
Cappelletti's first chapter presents a country by country survey
followed by a typological classification of the possible methods of
control: political and judicial, and among the latter, the systems
containing special institutions of judicial control and those lacking
such institutions. There follows, in Chapter II, a concise survey of the
historical antecedents of judicial review: the higher law conception of
1. Director of the Institute of Comparative Law, University of Florence.

2. J. BURKHARDT, FORCE AND FREEDOM 80 (J. Nichols transl. 1955).
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classical antiquity and of the Middle Ages; the control function
exercised in the French ancien r6gime by the regional supreme courts,
the Parlements, especially the Parlement de Paris; the French
Revolution theory of popular sovereignty; the idea of superiority of
the Common Law once held in England; the control of colonial
legislation exercised by the English Board of Trade. The American
technique pronounced by John Marshall is thus shown not to be, as it
is sometimes assumed, the first and sole fountainhead of all safeguards
of the basic human rights against encroachments by the law-giver.
Chapters III and IV constitute the detailed analysis of the system.
They are classified under two aspects. Institutions of centralized
control, such as the special constitutional courts of Austria, the
Federal Republic of Germany, or Italy are distinguished from those of
decentralized control as exemplified by the United States. The second
line of distinction is that between review of the constitutional
question principaliter, as designed for the Austrian Constitution of
1920 by Hans Kelsen, and the American system of review incidenter.
The two lines of distinction are connected with each other but they
do not coincide. Where, as in the United States, the question of the
constitutionality of acts of legislation can be reviewed by any court in
any case of civil or criminal litigation, the review is decentralized and
in one sense incidenter. But where, as also in the United States,
decisions of the top court are treated as binding precedents, the
determination of constitutionality when made by such a court is
principaliterin the sense of being decisive as against all the world-at
least as long as it is not overruled by the court. On the other hand,
centralized control may be both principaliterand incidenter, depending on whether it is decided abstractly by the constitutional court in
special proceedings dealing exclusively with the issue of constitutionality or upon reference by another court as an incidental question
arising in a concrete case.
Cappelletti's inquiry ranges over, it seems, all nations in which some
devices have been designed to safeguard the constitutional control of
acts of legislation, including France, where under the de Gaulle
Constitution of 1958 the constitutionality of bills can be tested by a
special organ, the Conseil constitutionel, before enactment by the
Assembl~e nationale, but not thereafter. The worldwide survey reveals
a wide variety of modifications and combinations of the basic systems.
In the final chapter, conclusions are drawn from the comparative
analysis of the various techniques. Their effectiveness for the
protection of the constitutional limitations or the powers of the
legislatures is critically evaluated.
Necessarily the reader is led to the conclusion that in the last
analysis the effectiveness of constitutional protection of basic human
Fall, 1972
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rights and of the ideal of social justice depends upon the personal
ethics of the individuals to whom the control is entrusted. American
experience has abundantly shown that control through the judiciaryfederal, and perhaps even more so, state-may be used to block
"social" legislation. The American scheme also holds another lesson,
that of the necessity of framing a constitution in such broad terms
that through the judiciary the text can be adapted to changing social
conditions even, and particularly when, the legislative branch is
unwilling or unable to take necessary action. Judicial control thus
holds the danger of usurpation of unwanted power by the judiciary, of
what Edouard Lambert, in his criticial inquiry into the American
situation of the first of the present century has aptly called le gouvernement des juges.3 Of necessity, the appointment of members of the
Supreme Court of the United States is thus treated as an issue of
the highest political significance. Where, as in European continental countries, the judiciary has traditionally occupied a position of lower status than that of American judges of courts
of last resort, judicial control has been vested in special bodies
composed of high members of the judiciary expected to be guarantors
of legal objectivity, and representatives of diverse political groupments. Where, as in France, the revolutionary distrust of the political
attitudes of the judiciary still lingers on, control of legislation once
enacted, or once promulgated by the Government on the basis of the
"reglementary power" constitutionally reserved to it, is excluded
altogether, and the pre-enactment control seems to be meant primarily
to protect the Government's law-making power against the Parliament.
In a country where, as in Yugoslavia, both the legislature and the
judiciary are dominated by an ultimately deciding political party,
judicial control seems to be limited to that division of powers between
the central government and the states which has been found necessary
to assuage the tensions traditionally existing between the various
nations of which Yugoslavia is composed. Cappelletti's work should
stimulate detailed research into the working of the Yugoslav system as
well as into that of the techniques nominally existing in the Soviet
Union where all legislatures and all judges are equally the organ of an
all-powerful party.
The American experience of both judicial resistance to "progressive" legislation and that of judicial activism reveals the delicate
nature of the relationship between legislatures and organs of control
of constitutionality of legislation. Such control will be exercised as a
means of promoting individual rights and social welfare if, and only if,
the individual members of the organ of control are imbued with the
3. 6 E. LAMBERT,
Vol. 6-No. 1

LE GOUVERNEMENT DES JUGES

(1923).
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spirit of liberalism and social welfare. Under all circumstances
acceptance of judicial control requires skillful exercise of the difficult
art of combining the traditional "application" of existing law with
moderation in volitional choices between policies. Both elements are
contained in every judicial decision. But in constitutional law the
political element is stronger than in ordinary cases. Its successful
exercise in the form of judicial decision requires skill, caution and
intuition on the part of the judges, and a high measure of respect on
the part of the public.
American experience points to another not altogether beneficial
aspect of judicial control of constitutionality of legislation. Raising
the issue of unconstitutionality may be used as a means to delay
decision in a desperate case and thus to press the other party into a
compromise. In that respect the practice of constitutional law
resembles that of the law of conflict of laws. Lawyers tend to shy
away from its mysteries and intricacies unless they can use it for
chicanery. One may well ask whether the invocation of constitutional
law in matters of minutiae is altogether wholesome. But how can
judicial control once institutionalized be restricted to issues of serious
political importance? And how, if it should be limited to such issues,
can one preserve the image that decision of constitutional questions is
"judicial"?
Another even more delicate problem is posed by attempts to
guarantee integrity of human rights through the operation of
supranational organs of control. So far no nation has been willing to
entrust the enforcement of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
to the International Court of Justice or to any other organ of the
United Nations. The cautious beginning of a hesitant subjection of
national sovereignty to the European Court of Human Rights deserves
careful observation.
The liveliness of the Cappelletti text indicates the book's origin in
lectures orally presented. A rich documentation is given in the
footnotes, together with additional thoughts of the author.
The book is well suited for the purpose its author seems to have had
in mind, that of serving as stimulating reading in courses of
constitutional law. Where such a course is devoted specifically to the
constitutional law of the United States, the book will present the
worldwide background before which problems and solutions of
American law will appear in a new, revealing light. Simultaneously, the
book constitutes a model for any kind of work in comparative law.
Max Rheinstein*
* Professor of Law emeritus, University of Chicago.
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THE PRICE OF INTERNATIONAL

JUSTICE.

Philip C. Jessup.'

New York:

Columbia University Press, 1971. Pp. ix, 82. $5.95.
This artful and engaging book of the Blaustein Lectures, given at
Columbia in 1970, poses a preliminary question: Who wrote it?
Professor Jessup, Judge Jessup, or Ambassador Jessup?
We can put Judge Jessup to one side. He scarcely makes an
appearance, even in the footnotes, sitting in his stiff Dutch palace,
dressed in his stiff continental robes, and pronouncing formal opinions
in the Roman style of the Code.
At first, it seems obvious that it is the Ambassador's book. The
lectures have the disarming air of worldly and rather resigned
after-dinner ruminations--good ruminations, after an excellent, ambassadorial dinner-ruminations altogether appropriate to the classic
interval for serious men's talk, while the host and his gentlemen guests
are enjoying brandy and cigars, before they rise to join the ladies.
How sad it is, really, the Ambassador seems to be saying, and how
unnecessary, that so few international disputes are submitted to the
International Court of Justice, to arbitration, or to other accepted
judicial methods for resolving international conflicts in peace, and in
accordance with the modes of law. Surely, he suggests, with a wave of
his brandy glass, the world would be a much better and safer place if
the nations used such procedures more often. After all, they worked
well in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Even better legal
machinery exists today. Why shouldn't they work again? Why are we
so foolish? Why doesn't the State Department do something to revive
and enlarge the custom?
In the end, however, for all its casualness, it is very much Professor
Jessup's book. The most frequently repeated rule of diplomacysurtout, pas de z~le-gives his style the mild patina of the chanceries.
The argument beneath, however, is closely reasoned, beautifully
crafted, and imbued with the Quixotic passion that is the hallmark of
academia in its finest moments. Professor Jessup argues:
Man will never discover peace and a cure for war, as we may reasonably
hope that man will discover health through a cure for cancer.
Yet each time that international judicial surgery is used to excise from
the world's political turbulence even a small irritant in the relations of two
countries, the world advances a few inches on the long road to peace. (p.
82).

1. Former Judge, International Court of Justice; former United States
Representative, United Nations Security Council and General Assembly; Hamilton
Fish Professor of International Law and Diplomacy, Emeritus, Columbia Law
School.
Vol. 6-No. 1
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In his first lecture, Professor Jessup sketches the model he wants
to see triumphant-the great vision of nations overcoming the
obstacles of politics and pride and submitting even serious, important
and explosive disputes to international tribunals for final settlement
"in accordance with generally accepted principes of international
law." Like so many other civilized and rational ideals for human
society, this practice gained influence steadily throughout the 19th
and early 20th centuries, but has withered since 1919, and especially
since 1945.
After all his wanderings among the continentals and the text
writers, Professor Jessup falls back on the case method of his youth.
In the brief, sharp strokes of a master, he evokes five important cases
in which nations were willing to swallow their pride and pay the price
of international justice by accepting the adverse decision of a tribunal
conscientiously attempting to apply the principles of international
law.
He starts, altogether properly, with the remarkable story of the
Alabama arbitration-a great monument in international law and
politics for many reasons. Not the least of those reasons, these days, is
that the decision rests on the fundamental principle that states are
quite as responsible for the use of force directed against other states
by private persons or irregular groups operating from their territories
as would be the case if their own forces had been involved. In the
controversy over the Alabama, the British Government had originally
taken the position that the dignity and honor of the nation precluded
submission to foreign judges of the question whether the British
Government had acted in good faith, and with due diligence, in failing
to prevent the armed raider Alabama and other Confederate cruisers
from slipping out of British ports. In the end, however, the principle
of arbitration was accepted, and the arbitration, successfully launched
by treaty, determined that Great Britain had indeed violated her
duties to the United States under international law, by providing
military assistance to revolutionary forces within another state.
The remaining four cases which constitute Professor Jessup's
paradigm illustrate less inflamed problems of international law. They
all are instances, however, in which governments had to suppress or
repress strongly exploited feelings of nationalism and base policy on
their larger but less visible interest in the development of a system of
peace.
The settlement of the eastern boundary of Alaska by arbitration in
1903 was complicated by the personalities of Theodore Roosevelt and
Sir Wilfred Laurier, and by the strong feelings boundary disputes
between the United States and Canada have always aroused in both
countries. The Rough Rider charged up San Juan Hill several times
Fall, 1972
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before and during the arbitration, and made its outcome precarious,
and problematical. But Elihu Root and Lord Alverstone managed to
achieve a judicial settlement of the dispute, despite the rage of the two
Canadian commissioners, who publicly denounced the award and
refused to sign it. Taking note of the uproar a little later, Lord
Alverstone responded classically at a London dinner:
If, when any kind of arbitration is set up they don't want a decision based
on the law and the evidence, they must not put a British judge on the
commission. (p. 12).
The third case Professor Jessup invokes is the boundary dispute
between Cambodia and Thailand, adjudicated by the International
Court of Justice in 1959. Significantly, the case was settled on the
basis of an earlier treaty between France and Siam--that is, a treaty of
the "colonial" era-whose legal authority is supposed to be doubtful,
especially in Communist countries and nations of the Third World.
Nonetheless, as Professor Jessup points out, the judges of the Court
did not divide along political or ideological lines. Similarly, in 1960
the Court settled a fifty year old boundary dispute between Nicaragua
and Honduras without revealing East-West or North-South divisions.
Finally, Jessup recalls the arbitration between India and Pakistan over
the Great Rann of Kutch, after the hostilities of 1965; there the
Indian Government, and indeed the Indian courts, accepted the
outcome despite the sensitivity of the issues and the passions of the
moment.
The second and third lectures document the widespread and
perhaps growing refusal of nations to accept the jurisdiction of courts
or other tribunals even for disputes over title to remote and
unimportant islands and channels, as well as to territory as vital as
Gibraltar or the Shatt al-Arab. In this class of situations, Professor
Jessup criticizes the Security Council for its regular and systematic
failure to use the procedure it employed successfully in the Corfu
Channel case-i.e. to take action under article 36 in recommending
the reference of a dispute to the International Court of Justice.2
Could the deepening tragedy of the Middle East have been avoided if
the authority of the General Assembly to determine the fate of
mandated territories had been authoritatively declared in 1947, in
terms as strong as those used in the Namibia decisions? 3 If an
adjudication had been obtained firmly establishing the international

2. The Corfu Channel Case, [1949] I.C.J. 4.
3. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa
in Namibia, [1971] I.C.J. 16.
Vol. 6-No. 1

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LA W

character of the Strait of Tiran and fights of passage through the Suez
Canal?
Why has the United Nations failed so miserably, even in this
modest aspect of its responsibility for keeping the peace? "Perhaps,"
Professor Jessup remarks, "the reason for such inaction is... that
delegates come to the United Nations not to settle their disputes but
to win them." (p. 45). Quoting at length and with approval from a
recent speech of Secretary Rogers, Professor Jessup takes hope.
It is encouraging that the United States seems to have roused from its
lethargy in promoting the International Court of Justice ....

If this

exploration... leads to the discovery of even small islands of peace in this
turbulent world, the voyage will outrank those of Cortez, Drake, Magellan
and Columbus. (p. 49-50).
The phenomenon is much deeper and more difficult to reverse,
however, than Professor Jessup indicates. It is the symptom of a grave,
perhaps a fatal illness, which cannot be dealt with by superficial
measures. No conceivable quantum of virtue, energy and charm on the
part of the State Department-however desirable-can have much
effect on the trend, unless it is part of a successful effort to stabilize
the world political system and enforce the Charter far more strictly.
Until nations come to believe that the world is reasonably safe and
take the political order for granted, fear cannot be dissipated, nor
faith restored.
It has proved impossible even to persuade Canada, Peru, or other
nations making extensive claims to fishing jurisdiction to allow the
legality of their claims to be tested by the International Court of
Justice or any other tribunal. "We cannot submit our ichthyological
patrimony to adjudication," patriots proclaim.
As the inhibitions supporting article 2(4) of the Charter have
weakened, and the world political system therefore disintegrated,
stage by stage, along the path to anarchy, many nations have turned to
more and more frenetic nationalism as their only bulwark,
psychologically and practically. Their security depends upon

4. See the debate reviewed in Bowett, ReprisalsInvolving Recourse to Armed
Force, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1972), modifying his earlier views, and conceding

that an acceptance of the legality of "reasonable" reprisals under article 51 is
necessary in the absence of the possibility that the Security Council can or will
enforce article 2(4). As compared to his earlier book, Mr. Bowett's article comes a
long way in accepting the realistic and persuasive basic analysis of Professor
McDougal. See M. McDoUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 232-53 (1961).
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configurations of forces they cannot control or, in many cases, even
influence. They seem to be more and more alone in a world whose
nightmares do not disappear at dawn. Absent a United Nations'
system for enforcing article 2(4) or strong coalitions determined to
achieve the same end through regional defense arrangements, since the
Security Council is paralyzed, survival for most nations-however
illusory-has come to mean reliance on the full range of measures within the historic concept of an "inherent" right of self-defense-reprisals and all.4 In such a world--a world of fear and insecurity in
which we have no choice but to live-it is no wonder that the nations
are less and less willing to entrust important disputes to international
tribunals.
In the voice of sweet reason, Professor Jessup shows conclusively
that with a little good will and mutual trust, many, perhaps most, of
the disputes which inflame international relations and are sometimes
the occasions of war could readily be settled by the existing
adjudicatory institutions of international law. He is, of course, quite
right.
But the political climate of trust and confidence which made the
Alabama arbitration possible has gone, like Humpty-Dumpty. We have
discovered that it is far easier to destroy habits, traditions, and
institutions, and the value systems which give them life, than it is to
replace them with social organisms of equivalent strength. In the
middle of Victoria's reign, when the Alabama arbitration took place,
all institutions seemed more stable and permanent than any now
appear. Despite brave swallows like the Cambodian case and the
settlement of the dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras, nations
simply do not believe that the I.C.J., or any other conceivable
tribunal, would in fact decide highly political cases in an impartial
way, on the basis of "generally accepted principles of international
law." The poisonous suspicion of political or ideological commitment,
even among the judges, is deeply rooted and rooted, alas, in
considerable experience.
Can we ever achieve again a political order generally capable of
practices like that of the Alabama arbitration? That should be the
subject of Professor Jessup's next book. It is no reproach to this one
that the task was not attempted.
Eugene V. Rostow*

* Sterling Professor of Law & Public Affairs, Yale Law School. A.B., 1933,
LL.B., 1937, Yale University; M.A., 1959, LL.D., 1962, Cambridge University.
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THREE WORLDS OF DEVELOPMENT: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF

INTERNATIONAL STRATIFICATION. By Irving Louis Horowitz.' New York:

Oxford University Press, 1972. Pp. xxx, 556. $15.00 (Paperback, $3.50).
For a century or so the separate disciplines of the social sciences
have become more specialized and technique-oriented, and consequently more isolated from each other. As long as their major concern
was with problems of "developed" or "modernized" societies this
isolation was not intolerable. However, once the intellectual world
discovered what is now called the Third World of poor and backward
nations, where economic, political, social and behavioral problems
have to be examined within a context of widespread, and often
abrupt, institutional change, the specialized models of each science
often provided answers to irrelevant questions. Social scientists talked
about economic and political problems, but they had precious little to
contribute toward the solution of the human problems we find in the
Third World. Economics, for instance, perhaps the most advanced
member of the family of social sciences, discovered only that
economic development was not simply an economic problem. As a
result, in recent decades the call has been loud, if not for the approach
of the 18th century moral philosophers, at least for more intensive
interdisciplinary research, leading, hopefully, to a true "social
science." There have been many attempts, none anywhere near
successful, and Horowitz's Three Worlds is yet another failure.
Horowitz sets out to examine the development path of the United
States (the First World) and the Soviet Union (the Second World), and
on the basis of the knowledge gleaned from this examination he then
attempts to predict, or perhaps to suggest, a "better" path for those
yet to come-the two-thirds of the human race still in the Third World
of poverty. Thus, the sub-title: "Theory and Practice of International
Stratification." Three Worlds was first published in 1966, and what we
have before us is Horowitz's attempt to update and revise the original
work after a span of six years. On the whole it is much the same work
as before, with very few new references; what new material there is
consists of passing remarks on works, largely of economists, that do
not substantially affect either Horowitz's approach or his conclusions.
It is doubtful that anyone owning the 1966 edition would want to
buy or read the 1972 edition, despite Horowitz's claim that his book
"remains as operational for diagnosing the development problems of
the seventies as the first edition was for the sixties." (p. xiii).
The new edition leaves us without a clear or workable definition of
development. It does show how difficult it is to distinguish among
1. Professor at Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey.
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degrees of development. Horowitz tries to differentiate between
development and mere change or growth, and between development
and modernism, but that still leaves him with the following categories:
developed, undeveloped, underdeveloped, overdeveloped and misdeveloped. Just how all these fit neatly into a schema of "three worlds"
is not made clear and we seem to be mired in classification and
definition, perceiving only dimly the inscrutable process of social
change.
Part I of the book deals with the Sociology, Ideology, Morphology
and Psychology of the Three Worlds. The last chapter, entitled
"Psychology of the Third World," includes a new concluding
paragraph noting that "race in some measure can be treated as an
independent variable and not simply as a function of class in the
developmental process." (p. 113). Yet, in a book structured around
the importance of classes and conflict between classes, that is about all
we hear of the problems of race and color, and Horowitz's fairly
detailed subject index does not refer to either.
Part II is a review of historical development in Worlds One and
Two. Chapter 7, "The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Third
World," is completely new, but it repeats much of what is said
elsewhere in the book and contains a belabored discussion of such
very elementary notions as an explanation of Colin Clark's sequence
of development into primary, secondary and tertiary economies, and
Horowitz's comments on classifying social systems on the basis of how
economic decisions are made into traditional, command and market
economies. Surely this is stuff for elementary texts, not for a treatise
on the problems of world development. This is immediately followed
by what seems to be a not particularly relevant commentary on "Marx
and determinism," in the middle of which we read that the emergence
of the welfare state as a reaction to the Great Depression, "verifies
Marx's prediction that increased economic planning would be necessary as the capitalist system developed." (p. 211). Marx never made
such a prediction 2 and what predictions he did make have subsequent-

2. In one of the very few references to planning in a socialist society Marx
simply noted that labor would be apportioned "in accordance with a definite
social plan [which] would maintain the proper proportion between the different
kinds of work to be done and the various wants of the community." 1 K. MARX,
CAPITAL 79 (1967). Not much help here for Indian or Cuban planners! As
Heilbroner has stated, Capital is the Doomsday Book of capitalism, and in all of
Marx there is "almost nothing which looks beyond the Day of Judgment to see
what lineaments paradise may present." R. HEILBRONER, THE WORLDLY
PHILOSOPHERS

Vol. 6-No. 1
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ly been proven wrong. Marx did, of course, write reams of pages on
the historical development of capitalism, but he was pitifully negligent
when it came to looking into the future and predicting how the
economic structure would look once socialism or communism took
over. Not only did he have nothing to say about "planning" but most
scholars have pointed out that Marxian economics is inferior in this
respect to "bourgeois" economics. As Oscar Lange lamented years ago:
What can Marxian economics say about monopoly prices? What has it to say
on the fundamental problems of monetary and credit theory? What
apparatus has it to offer for analysing the incidence of a tax, or the effect of
a certain technical innovation on wages? And (irony of Fate!) what can
Marxian economics contribute to the problem of the optimum distribution
of productive resources in a socialist economy?3
There is one interesting idea discussed at the very end of Chapter 7.
This is the "convergence thesis," which raises the question whether
economic development gradually eliminates national differences. If so,
the convergence of the major powers within the First and Second
Worlds may present a polarization of the world economies into the
"haves" and the "have-nots," forming, as Horowitz calls it, a new
dyad. Perhaps Horowitz's next edition will then have to be entitled
Two Worlds of Development.
Part III in both the old and new editions examines in depth the
development of the Third World from the economic, political, social
and psychological points of view. This is, perhaps, the soundest
section of the book, but surely not original at this late date in the
history of development literature. The concluding Part IV is thin, and
ends in mere formalism, in what Horowitz calls his "model of
models." (p. 510). The latter is a series of some 181 short statements.
I list only six to give their flavor: (1) the forced maintenance of the
social process at the expense of the social structure is called social
coercion; (2) the forced maintenance of the social structure at the
expense of the social process is called social coercion; (3) the
unobstructed transformation of an old structure into a new structure
is called social consensus; (4) the unobstructed transformation of old
processes into new processes is called social consensus; (5) on a
national scale, the assignment of labor tasks is based upon sex, age,
race, and caste; and (6) on an international scale, the assignment of
labor tasks is based upon color, language, and geography. This "model
of models," for which Horowitz tells us he is indebted to Pareto (in
sociology) and Wittgenstein (in linguistic philosophy), represents his

3. Lange, Marxian Economics and Modern Economic Theory, 2 REv. ECoN.
STUDIES

189, 191-92 (1935).
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"attempt to come to terms with the problem of development by
considering the interplay of social order and social change." (p. 510). I
cannot imagine any scholar interested in development or modernization benefitting from a study of these pages, which apparently
represent the capstone of the entire work.
In one sense it might be said that Horowitz is trying to describe
how development took place, to ascertain the social costs it required
in the United States and the Soviet Union, and to offer some
indication of what the future holds in each social system. His purpose
presumably is to lay bare two alternative paths open to poor and
underdeveloped nations as they begin their pursuit of socio-economic
development. Indeed, the opening sentence of the book quotes Marx's
well-known but unsubstantiated statement that "[t] he country that is
more developed industrially only shows to the less developed the
image of its own future." (p. 1). And the critical choice then facing
Third World planners is: Which image?
Apparently Horowitz assumes that an understanding of the differences in the approaches of the first Two Worlds will, or ought to,
guide decision making in changing society in the Third World. The
relation between the desire to understand and the desire to change
society probably is vastly more complicated than this implies, but
even if this were not so the social research that may guide decisions is
never itself solely objective or simply scientific. Gunnar Myrdal has
recently noted: "the implicit belief in... a body of scientific
knowledge acquired independently of all valuations [is] ... naive
empiricism." 4 But granting this, there is in Horowitz's presentation a
powerful, steady and pervasive bias against the market mechanism and
in favor of "authoritarian models" which, at least for this reader,
distracts from Three Worlds' usefulness as a "style of handling social
facts." Two examples, from many, should suffice to illustrate the
point.
In the chapter on U.S. development we read that "the mechanical
age has succeeded in displacing human labor power [which] has
become fragmented, alienated, and deeply torn from the social
fabric," so that men become "transform[ed] into instruments,
commodities, or things which are themselves measured by the
products they create, and thus give an 'anti-human' and 'pro-machine'
quality to society," making labor spokesmen "outraged at the miseries
brought about by planless progress." (p. 155). In the following chapter
on Soviet development, however, the hardships of its early industrialization process are summarized in the statement that "the factory [was]
a learning experience, and brought science to factory management."
4. G. MYRDAL,
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(p. 173). On the basis of such comments the politico-technologist in
the Third World today would surely choose public over private
ownership of factories. One wonders if his choice would be so clear
and easy if he had instead imbibed his knowledge from Bertrand

Russell (hardly a supporter of the bourgeois society). Upon his return
from the Soviet Union in 1925, Russell noted the similarities of the
factory system in Russia and that which had existed in early 19th
century Britain: "long hours, a sweated wage, prohibition of strikes,
absolute submission of the workers to the captains of industry."'
Quite a "learning experience." Russell attributed the similarities to the
attempt, in both England and the Soviet Union, to achieve industrialization without the help of foreign capital. Such was not the case in
the United States, and consequently most scholars would agree that
American industrial workers bore less of the social costs of industrial
growth than their counterparts in the Soviet Union's "forced
industrialization," and in England's "First Industrial Revolution."
Horowitz's strong ideological bias against the market-oriented
decentralized decision system shows most vividly in his discussion of
the role of terror in development. He says:
It is useful to divide Soviet terror between that aimed at stifling liberal
freedom of speech.., and that form of terror aimed at recalcitrant classes
as a means of boosting economic development. [Terror] is a method for
control of the economy through the political apparatus.... Thus, the
victory of the Soviet Revolution represented the triumph of bureaucracy no
less than of socialism.... Terror may have helped bring Russia into the
modem technological world .... [W] hile the average efficiency of conscript
labor was perhaps half that of free labor, its value in Russia's "take-off
period" can hardly be questioned .... Terror was vindicated as a necessary
feature of accomplishing the tasks of the social revolution [and demonstrating] that the socialist revolution was possible, it became a desired goal
for other countries .... Clearly, the Soviet development has given enormous
stimulus to new forms of controlled development.... The final question
here is not an easy one: To what degree is terrorism warranted on pragmatic
grounds? ... [T]errorism was the consequence of an approach to development in which planning, decision-making, and policy-determination were all
centralized and expected to be realized--whatever their human
cost.... Political liberalism has turned out to be less viable with respect to
sustained high industrial growth rates than totalitarianism at least in the
context of a less than fully educated or fully cultivated underclass. (p.
175-92).
One can only wonder what impact this type of analysis is supposed
to make on the leaders of the Third World-those "caretakers of
5. B.
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transitional regimes and transitional economies."

This vision of

Horowitz in the role of the "sociologist becoming the physician of
society" is a disconcerting one, at least to the many who still believe

that planning, or social management, is compatible with democracy
and liberalism. It is, of course, quite true that the guts needed for the

assault on the "Threshold," or the social fortitude necessary to
achieve the "Great Ascent" places tremendous strains on any political

structure. And it may be that "Western democracy" as we know it in
the United States may not be a viable political vehicle for rapid

development today in the Third World. Nevertheless, the pendulum
need not swing all the way. Surely the Turkey of Ataturk and the
Brazil of Medici cannot be equated with the Russia of Stalin or the
China of Mao. If indeed there is no "in between," then one can only
ask: is it all worthwhile? Horowitz seems to think so. How ironic--I
used to think it was only some economists who, on occasion caught
up in the enthusiasm of the Cornucopia of Economic Development,
sometimes forgot the cost side.
One comes away disappointed, and a little wearied, from
Horowitz's big book of over 550 pages with some 700 references to
the vast interdisciplinary literature of social and economic development. I had trouble pin-pointing my own dissatisfaction until I
remembered the distinction Isaiah Berlin made in his brilliant essay on
Tolstoy's view of history.6 There he noted that intellectual thinkers
can be divided into two groups: those who pursue many ends "often
unrelated and even contradictory, connected, if at all, only in some de
facto way," and these he labelled the Foxes. At the other end of the
scale were the Hedgehogs: those who possessed, or at least thought
they possessed, some universal explanatory principle giving them a
monistic vision of life. Now it seems to me Horowitz is encamped in
neither of these categories, but rather represents the sorry spectacle of
a frustrated Fox bitterly intent upon seeing in the manner of a
Hedgehog. But, of course, in this predicament he surely is not alone.
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